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Abstract— In this paper, we present our approach of 
finding relevant malware behaviour texts from 
Malware Threat Reports as described by Lim [1]. 
Our main contribution is the opening attempt of 
Transfer Learning approaches, and how they 
generalize for the classification tasks like malware 
behaviour analysis. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The digital landscape is unique and constantly 
changing, creating room for cyber-attacks. Amidst 
the rise of these security threats and vulnerabilities, it 
has become crucial to identify it and take the 
appropriate action. With the advancements in the 
digital landscape, we need better security tools to 
combat different kinds of threats. By 2019, there was 
a 13% rise in pre-installed malware and adware on 
Android devices, and what’s even more shocking, the 
Macs, which are known for its durable security 
barriers, had more threats detected than Windows. 
These attacks play with one's data, money and privacy. 
This urges the large scale companies and customers 
to effectively know where they are at alerting, 
blocking and detecting threats. 
Advance Persistent Threat (APT) is a targeted 
attack in which an intruder gains access to a network 
to monitor network activity and steal data rather than 
to cause damage to the network or organization. APT 
reports contain detailed malware behaviour analysis 
of their onset and traversal through our system when 
under attack. Despite the extant repositories of these 
malware [2], it becomes difficult for security 
researchers to skim through these huge databases to 
find useful content. Reading through the massive 
documents, make it impossible to analyse and quickly 
act upon the adversary. There is a need to be able to 
automate this process without having to read through 
the entire report. 
The advent of these malware threat reports 
engenders the security analysts to make use of natural 
language processing (NLP) algorithms, to identify, 
cluster, analyse the pattern of malware [3]. Keeping 
this in mind, we propose some malware text isolation 
techniques to detect such sentences, and further 
develop a relationship between them. 
Upon delineating sentences depicting malware [4] 
behaviour capabilities from the large volume of threat 
reports will help security analysts to quickly decide 
evasion strategies from the threat landscape, 
clustering malware [5] which have similar behaviour, 
learn about the security vulnerabilities of the 
enterprise and strengthen the system from similar 
future attacks. 
Managing the extraction of such sentences from 
large corpora, we can generalize and cluster similar 
Malwares together, further helping new researches to 
analyse and reduce the vulnerabilities in the networks. 
Albeit the applications are endless, not much work 
has been done in conjunction with applying Natural 
Language Processing and Malware [6] Analysis as in 
the following references. 
 
For example, the following sentence does not 
depict malware behaviour: 
 
Once decoded, FireEye identified the payload as a 
poison ivy variant. 
 
Whereas, the next sentence is describing the course 
of action upon attack by an intruder: 
 
The backdoor contained versioning info which 
attempted to masquerade as a Google Chrome File.  
 
Our main contributions are: 
1) We introduce transformers approaches like 
ULMFiT, BERT, XLNETs for the malware 
characteristics classification task. 
2) We discuss different sampling approaches to the 
class imbalance. 
3) We make an opening attempt in investigating 
the effectiveness of transfer learning for the problems 
in the domain of security. 
 
II. RELATED WORK 
In 2018, SemEval organized a shared task called 
SecureNLP on semantic analysis for cybersecurity 
texts 1. Task 1 was a binary classification task of 
sentences extracted from APT reports which had 
malware behaviour or not. In this section, we briefly 
describe the approaches by the competition for the 
task. 
Using Glove embeddings proposed by Pennington 
[7], Villani [8], outperformed the rest of the 
competition in Subtask 1 only. With Long Short Term 
Memory network (LSTM), they generated token 
representation from the characters. Following that, a 
binary classifier was trained with Bi-directional Long 
Short-Term Memory network (BiLSTM). 
Flytxt NTNU [9] assembled an ensemble of 
Conditional Random Field (CRF) and Naive Bayes 
classifier for SubTask 1. The CRF model used 
lexical-based and context-based features. If the CRF 
 
 
	
predicts any “BIO” token labels (SubTask2) for the 
sentence, the sentence is considered relevant in 
SubTask 1. 
DM-NLP [10] used the predicted output labels 
from SubTask 2 to get the predictions for SubTask 1. 
They model this task as a sequence labelling task and 
used a hybrid approach with BiLSTM-CNNCRF as 
mentioned in [11].  
HCCL [12] performed a very similar approach to 
team DM-NLP using the same BiLSTM-CNN-CRF 
architecture. They used relatively simpler Part-Of-
Speech (POS) features, instead of the more 
complicated linguistic features like the former team. 
They aim to build an end-to-end system without any 
feature engineering or data preprocessing.  
Digital Operatives [13] utilized a passive-
aggressive classifier Reference [14], which has 
comparable cost and performance with the linear 
Support Vector Machine classifier, for SubTask 1. 
The features they applied include POS, dependency 
links, and bigrams.  
TeamDL [15] built a convolutional neural 
network with original glove embeddings. UMBC [16] 
used a Multilayer Perceptron model for the 
submission of SubTask 1. Inspired from the tasks, 
Ravikiran [17] has proposed a multimodal dataset 
with QR-codes and Malware Text classification. 
In this paper, we particularly focus on language 
modelling approach for the malware behaviour 
classification. The following section describes our 
approaches. 
III. OUR METHODOLOGY 
In this section, we aim to discuss in detail our 
approach to solve subtask 1. After analysing the 
previously designed models, our team worked on 
some new approaches towards the challenge. The 
following section discusses the details of the steps 
used for the construction of these experiments. 
 
A. Preprocessing 
We preprocessed the models by removing 
punctuations, numbers, and did the following 
modifications: 
• .exe like copy.exe files to [EXE]. 
• Buffer memory and Stack memory addresses like 
0x20000001 are replaced by [ADDRESS]. 
• Malware TrojanDropper.Win32.Agent.life name 
replaced by [MALWARE]. 
• .bat, .doc, .txt file names replaced by [FILE]. 
• File paths to [PATH].  
• IP Addresses to [IP]. 
 
We further removed texts which were not in 
English and had only numbers. 
B. SubTask1: Malware Threat Classification 
This section gives an in-depth detail of the 
transformer models used for the classification task for 
SubTask1. The models aimed to extract the 
cybersecurity-related terms from a sentence and then 
classify them into one of the two classes: malware 
related or non-malware related. Figure 1 shows the 
model architecture. 
 
Fig. 1 Model Architecture 
1)  ULMFit: [18] is short for Universal Language 
Model Fine-Tuning for Text Classification. The 
authors’ brought out the disadvantages of using 
traditional word embedding approaches [19] directly 
with deep neural networks. The random initialization 
of Out of Vocabulary (OOV) Words which disrupts 
the pre-trained layers and causes catastrophic 
forgetting. To overcome that the paper discusses 
different approaches of gradual freezing and 
discriminate fine-tuning. The ULMFiT’s backbone is 
divided into the following stages:  
1) Language Model pre-training 
2) Language Model fine-tuning 
3) Classifier Model fine-tuning 
It is a universal model as it works with varying 
document sizes, requires no custom feature 
engineering nor preprocessing, and uses a single 
architecture. AWD-LSTM language model is used in 
the architecture which comprises a conventional 
LSTM with no added attention. We tried 
experimenting with the data for the language model, 
adding domain-specific data. But this addition didn’t 
account for any improvement. 
ULMFiT’s conventional parameters of fast.ai were 
used to train the language models. Finally, we find the 
best hyperparameters by learning rate finder and train 
the classifier over the task data. 
The problem with ULMFiT is the words in a 
sentence are sequentially processed and still does not 
capture the true meaning of the context 
2)  BERT: Bidirectional Encoder Representations 
from Transformers (BERT) [20] was the first 
language model which is deeply bidirectional, 
unsupervised language representation, pre-trained 
using only a plain text corpus. This model takes the 
entire context and processes it simultaneously, 
capturing the true context of a word. 
Transformer has two mechanisms - an encoder and 
a decoder. Encoder reads the text input and the 
Decoder gives a prediction for the intended task. 
BERT makes use of the Transformer’s Encoder 
Architecture, which has an attention mechanism that 
 
 
	
learns contextual relations between words in a 
sentence. 
It performs two tasks for language modelling: 
1) Masked Language Modelling Bert randomly 
[MASKS] a word and predicts it using its context 
from left and right simultaneously. This masked 
language model (MLM) learns to model relationships 
between words and sentences. 
2) Next Sentence Prediction Model This model 
takes two sentences as its input S1 and S2, and 
verifies whether S2 follows S1, capturing the 
relationship between sentences. 
For this challenge, we have used the pre-trained 
Hugging Face implementation of the BERT-base 
model and fine-tuned it for our task dataset. 
3)  XLNets: XLNET [21] has a very similar 
architecture, as of BERT. It uses a different approach 
of masking and uses Transformer XL model instead 
of a Transformer model. Instead of masked language 
modelling, XLNET uses permutation language 
modelling (PLM). It blends the concept of 
autoregressive models and bidirectional context 
modelling. PLM is the idea of capturing a 
bidirectional context by training an autoregressive 
model on all possible permutation of words in a 
sentence. Instead of fixed left-right or right-left 
modelling, XLNET maximizes expected log-
likelihood over all possible permutations of the 
sequence. In expectation, each position learns to 
utilize contextual information from all positions 
thereby capturing bidirectional context. No [MASK] 
is needed and input data need not be corrupted. 
 
IV.  EVALUATION 
This section gives a detailed overview of the 
dataset introduced in the SubTask1, Semeval Task 8: 
SecureNLP Challenge. Since the data was highly 
imbalanced we tried various undersampling and 
oversampling approaches. This section concludes 
with details of hyperparameters used, metric chosen 
for evaluation and the results obtained. 
 
Table I Dataset 
 Documents Sentence 
Train 65 9,424 
Dev 5 1,213 
SubTask1 test 5 618 
Total 75 11,250 
 
A. Dataset 
The total statistics of the dataset are shown in Table 
I. The training data for this shared task contains 9,424 
sentences, the validation data contains 1,213 
sentences, and test data has 618 test sentences. Figure 
2 shows the huge class imbalance between malware 
related/non-malware related sentences. 
 
Fig. 2.  Dataset Frequency 
B. Metrics 
The evaluation metric chosen by the Challenge to 
evaluate the performance of the malware 
classification task was f1 score. We have computed 
the Precision and Recall as well. Precision is the 
fraction of relevant instances among the total 
retrieved instances. Recall is the fraction of relevant 
instances retrieved over the total amount of relevant 
instances. Precision is computed as: 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑇𝑃𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃 
Recall is computed as: 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 = 𝑇𝑃𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁 
F1 score is computed using precision and recall as 
follows: 𝐹1 = 2 × 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛	 + 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 
 
The systems were learned from the training 
validation data and tested on the evaluation data. 
 
Fig. 3.  Sampling Ratio 
C. Sampling 
Now that we know how to set up the evaluation 
scheme and what metrics to choose for classification 
problems with imbalanced data, we apply some 
techniques to account for class imbalance. The most 
straightforward technique is to balance the data by 
resampling: 
1) Down-sampling (Under sampling) the majority 
class 
2) Up-sampling (Over sampling) the minority class 
 
 
 
	
Without resampling the data, one can also make the 
classifier aware of the imbalanced data by 
incorporating the weights of the classes into the cost 
function. Intuitively, we want to give higher weight 
to minority class and lower weight to the majority 
class. We have tried class weight techniques for 
BERT. While training the Language Model for 
ULMFiT, We observed that fine-tuning the language 
model on a larger dataset didn’t provide much 
improvement. For more data, we scraped threat 
reports from MalwareTextDB1.0. We finetuned the 
language model over 6200 (scraped data) + 11,250 
(original data). For scraping, we used the tokenized 
data and assigned a sentence class 0 when all the BIO 
token-indexes were O, else we assigned it to class 1. 
In Table III we show the hyperparameters which 
yielded good performance models. In Figure 2, we 
show the different sampling ratios used against the F1 
Score predicted for both oversampling and 
undersampling models using BERT-cased. 
 
Table II Experimental Results on SubTask 1 
Model Remarks Epochs Precision Recall F1 score 
BERT Oversampling 1:10 6 0.37 0.85 0.51 
BERT Oversampling 1:2 10 0.31 0.85 0.46 
BERT Oversampling 1:2 6 0.32 0.96 0.48 
BERT Oversampling 1:2 3 0.33 0.93 0.48 
BERT No sampling 5 0.49 0.55 0.52 
BERT Undersampling 1:1 5 0.62 0.28 0.38 
XLNET Undersampling 1:2 5 0.29 0.89 0.44 
XLNET No sampling 10 0.36 0.64 0.46 
XLNET No sampling 4 0.26 0.88 0.41 
ULMFIT No sampling, LM 
with same dataset 
20 0.74 0.25 0.38 
ULMFIT No sampling, LM 
with same dataset 
30 0.42 0.48 0.45 
ULMFIT No sampling, LM 
with same dataset 
50 0.30 0.48 0.37 
ULMFIT LM with larger 
dataset 
5-10 0.90 0.16 0.27 
 
D. Result 
Table II shows the comparison of F1 scores on test 
data for SubTask1. The BERT-cased model showed 
the best performance amongst the different 
transformers. Figure 3, presents the performance of 
the BERT-cased model on the training data for 
different oversampling and undersampling ratios. We 
observed that oversampling performance was better 
than undersampling. However, the results without 
any sampling were the best one. Therefore, the model 
that we used on the test data was trained on the full 
training dataset maintaining the given ratio of 
malware: non-malware tweets. Table III shows the 
hyperparameters of the best running models.  
 
 
Table III Hyperparameters of Best Performing Models 
Model Hyperparameters 
BERT 
ULMFit 
epochs=5, batch size=32, learning rate=3e-5 
epochs= 30, batch size=32, learning rate = 2e-6 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we present a transformer approach 
targeting SemEval 2018 shared task on Semantic 
Extraction from CybersecUrity REports using 
Natural Language Processing (SecureNLP). We were 
able to produce a model that generates feasible results 
for estimating the relevance of sentences in the 
context of security information. Our algorithm’s 
efficacious performance will be fruitful for the 
security analysts who were our intended end-users. 
With the help of our research, we can accentuate the 
sentences in the APT reports. Our end users can 
quickly skim through large reports and improve their 
enterprises’ evasion and prevention strategies in 
times of adversaries. 
We believe our research can take a new direction 
if we improve more on the quality of the dataset. We 
worked on the available datasets but in the future, we 
plan on working on a better dataset. We plan to make 
use of the large model of BERT which has more 
number of attention layers in it and thus is expected 
to perform better than the base model used in our 
approach. We also plan to explore other SubTasks, 
which revolve on entity extraction and linking with 
the use of these transformers and make an end-to-end 
system. 
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